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REAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT IN MONTANA
John F. Sullivan
INTRODUCTION
Although during the last sixty years the significance of the property
tax as a revenue source for state government has declined markedly,'
the property tax still provides about ninety per cent of the tax revenue
for Montana's local units of government. 2 More significantly, of all
the tax revenues collected in Montana in 1970, approximately sixty per
cent were derived from the property tax.3 Furthermore, in 1970 about
one-half of the property taxes collected were derived from real estate
and improvements thereon.4 The statistics indicate that the real estate
property tax is substantial enough that Montana taxpayers ought to be
concerned about the manner of its administration.
The main deficiencies in the administration of the property tax are
in the assessment process, the determination of the value of property
for tax purposes. Of all the steps necessary to determine property tax
liability, assessment is the most crucial, but also the most difficult to
control. It is crucial because it is the first step in the taxing process.
Consequently, if the assessment is improper, no step which follows can
lay claim to validity or propriety. It is the most difficult to control
because the determination of value is a complex process, involving a
high degree of discretion, judgment, and opinion.5
The two major defects in the assessment system in Montana are
underassessment and the absence of uniform assessments. 6 Underassess-
ment (or fractional assessment) occurs when property is assessed at
less than the level required by law. Non-uniform assessment exists when
different classes of property within a taxing jurisdiction are assessed
at different levels of value, or when property of the same class is
"''In 1913 property taxes amounted to approximately 50% of the state's tax revenue;
by 1959 the percentage had fallen to 11.29%." MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
PROPERTY TAXATION IN MONTANA, Report No. 6 (1960) at 1.
2
"In 1913 property taxes supplies almost 88% of all local tax income, more than 95%
in 1932, and in excess of 93% in 1957." Id. at 2. See also, MONTANA LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL, MONTANA TAXATION, Report No. 23 (1966) at 4.
OThe exact figure was 59.48%. MONTANA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, TWENTY-
FOURTH BIENNIAL REPORT (1968-1970) at 12.
41d. at 10.
6The Montana supreme court has consistently recognized the highly discretionary na-
ture of the assessment process. So broad is the assessor's discretion that
[C]ourt will ordinarily not interfere with the action of . . . [assessors] to correct
mere errors of judgment. It is only where they act fraudulently or maliciously,
or the error or mistake is so gross as to be inconsistent with any exercise of
honest judgment, that courts will grant relief. Danforth v. Livingston, 23 Mont.
558, 59 P. 916, 917 (1900).
See also, Johnson v. Johnson, 92 Mont. 512, 15 P.2d 842, 844-845 (1932); and State
ex rel. Schoonover v. Stewart, 89 Mont. 257, 297 P. 476, 481. (1931).
6PROPERTY TAXATION IN MONTANA, supra note 1 at 29.
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assessed at varying levels of value.7 The perennial and universal nature
of fractional and non-uniform assessments is well documented.8
In Montana, the problems of fractional and non-uniform assess-
ment have been given a unique character by the State Board of Equali-
zation. In most states, where these problems are as serious as in Mon-
tana, one of two courses of action is followed. First, the state may
enact legislation legalizing current assessment levels and variations.
Second, the agencies responsible for assessment may make fractional
and non-uniform assessments as a matter of informal administrative
policy. In Montana, however, fractional and non-uniform assessment
of realty and its improvements is (1) expressly prohibited by statute,
but (2) expressly commanded by the rules and directives of the State
Board of Equalization. Thus, fractional and non-uniform assessment in
Montana are not only practical administrative problems, but also involve
questions as to the legal extent and nature of the power of the State
Board of Equalization.
The power of the State Board of Equalization to compel fractional
and non-uniform assessments of land and improvements is the subject
of this comment.9 Using an historical and legal approach, three general
topics will be considered: (1) the present statutory real property tax
system; (2) the assessment of land and improvements according to the
present constitution, the State Board of Equalization, and the Montana
supreme court; and (3) the assessment of land and improvements under
the new constitution and recently enacted legislation implementing the
new constitution.
qn Montana it is imperative that state-wide uniformity be achieved. In other words,
assessment uniformity must exist not only within the several counties, which are
the usual "taxing jurisdictions," but also among the several counties. The main
reason for this is that the multi-million dollar school foundation program distributes
state revenue to the counties on the basis of need. Need is determined by the num-
ber of pupils in each county and the amount of money that a uniform levy will
raise in each county. If there is not uniform assessment among counties, the amount
raised by a uniform levy is not an accurate measure of relative need. The counties
with lower levels of assessment receive an inequitably large share of the state aid for
schools.
8See, for example: PROPERTY TAXATION IN MONTANA, supra note 1 at 29; REPORT OF
THE TAX AND LICENSE COMMISSION TO TIlE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION (1917-1918)
at 10-11; SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CLASSIFICATION AND APPRAISAL, REPORT TO THE
MONTANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Feb. 5, 1963) at 7; STAFF OF SENATE COMM.
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATION, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION AND
ASSESSMENT PRACTICES IN MONTANA at 41 (1972); and COMMENT, Property Tax
Equalization and Assessment: A Proposal for Reform, 50 NEB. L. REV. 103,
105-107 (1971).
This paper considers only the assessment of realty and improvements which are ini-
tially assessed by the counties. Generally, this includes farm and grazing land; urban
vacant lots; suburban tracts; and commercial, industrial, and residential land and
buildings. It does not include railroad or utility property which, under § 84-708(3),
R.C.M. 1947, is initially assessed by the State Board of Equalization. Also, the
assessment of timber land, though made initially by the counties, will not be con-
sidered.
1973]
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THE PRESENT STATUTORY REAL PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM
The determination of real property tax under the applicable Mon-
tana statutes is a three-step process involving: (1) assessment of value;
(2) determination of taxable value; and (3) computation of tax by
applying the appropriate mill levy to taxable value.
With respect to the initial assessment of value, § 84-401, R.C.M. 1947
provides that: "All taxable property must be assessed at its full cash
value." The term "full cash value" is defined in § 84-101, R.C.M. 1947
as "the amount at which the property would be taken in payment of a
just debt from a solvent debtor." In the vernacular, full cash value
means market value.
The determination of taxable value is made by applying Montana's
property classification laws, §§ 84-301 and 84-302, R.C.M. 1947.10 Under
these statutes various percentages are applied to the assessed values of
the different classes of taxable property. The taxable value of land and
improvements thereon is thirty per cent of full and true value.1 Tax
liability is then computed by simply applying the set mill levy to taxable
value.
The present statutory real property tax system may be illustrated
by the following example. Grazing land, a dwelling house, a vacant
lot, and an office building, all of which have a market value of $10,000,
should all be assessed at $10,000. The taxable value of each of these,
under the classification laws, should be $3,000.12 If the same millage
rate is levied against each kind of property, the tax liability for each
of them should be identical. However, under directives of the State
Board of Equalization, the house, vacant lot, and office building are to
be initially assessed at about thirty-eight per cent of market value, or,
in the example above, $3,800. When the classification law is applied,
taxable value is about $1,200.13 The grazing land, on the other hand, is
"The purpose of these sections, enacted in 1919, was
. . . to shift the burden of taxes from property, as such, to productivity, or, in other
words, to impose the burdens of government upon property in proportion to its use,
its productivity, its utility, its general setting in the economic organization of society,
so that every one will be called upon to bear the burdens, or as nearly so as may be,
and to relieve administrative officers from the apparent necessity of continuing the
legal fiction of full valuation in the face of contrary facts. Hilger v. Moore, 56 Mont.
146, 82 P. 477, 483 (1919).
"There are a few exceptions to this rule. For example, the taxable value of a dwelling
house (and its lot) owned by a totally disabled veteran is only seven per cent of full
and true value; the land and improvements thereon of "new industries" have a tax-
able value of only seven per cent of their true and full value; and the homes of the
needly elderly and needy widows with children have a taxable value of only fifteen
per cent of their true and full value. See, §§ 84-301 and 84-302, R.C.M. 1947.
12This is assuming none of the exceptions set forth in note 11 are applicable.
"In 1966 the state-wide ratio of taxable value to appraised value of single-family
dwellings was, in fact, 10.3 per cent, fourteen per cent below the twelve per cent
target set by the State Board of Equalization. BUREAU OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC
RESEARCH OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA, MONTANA FISCAL AFFAIRS STUDY (1969-
1970) at 387.
[Vol. 3.1
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to be initially assessed at only about twenty per cent of its market
value, $2,000 in the example above. When the classification law is
applied, the taxable value of the grazing land is about $600.14 If equal
mill levies are applied against all of these properties, the house, vacant
lot, and office building will pay double the tax of grazing land worth
the same amount. 15
ASSESSMENT OF LAND AND IMPROVEMENTS UNDER THE
PRESENT CONSTITUTION
THE FORTY PER CENT RULE; FRACTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF LAND AND
IMFINOVEMENTS
A. Administrative History
On November 13, 1963, the State Board of Equalization issued a
directive to the county assessors and county commissioners of all Mon-
tana counties, ordering them to assess city and town lots and rural
and urban improvements at forty per cent of their appraised value. The
appraised values were those established under a statewide reappraisal
program instituted in 1957 and completed, in most counties, in 1962.16
The appraised values represented ninety-five per cent of full cash or
market value, 17 and were based primarily on the sales prices of the
appraised property or comparable property.18 The intended effect of
the directive was to compel assessment of city and town lots and rural
and urban improvements at about thirty-eight per cent of their full
cash or market value.
B. The Effect of the Forty Per Cent Rule on Legislative Tax and
Spending Policy
Fractional assessment as a matter of sound tax administration and
economic policy has been consistently condemned by property tax
"In 1966 the state-wide ratio of taxable value to market value of farm and grazing
land was, in fact, 6.6 per cent, ten per cent above the six per cent standard set by
the State Board of Equalization. Id.
"In fact, due to the variances indicated in notes 13 and 14, the house, vacant lot, and
apartment building will pay only about 1.6 times the tax on the grazing land. Id.
"The reappraisal program was authorized by §§ 84-429.7 et. seq., R.C.M. 1947.
17The ninety-five percent figure is used to insure that if there is some error in the
appraisal, it will, in the majority of cases, not be to the disadvantage of the tax-
payer.
"The MONTANA APPRAISAL MANUAL, published May 4, 1966, by the State Board of
Equalization, authorizes, at 3-6, three methods for determining the market value of
city and town lots and rural and urban improvements. These are: (1) the cost
approach for valuing improvements, under which value is reproduction cost new less
functional and structural depreciation; (2) the market approach, under which value
is the actual sale price of the appraised property or comparable property; and (3)
the income approach, under which value is the present value of future net income.
The market approach is said to be the only means by which the true market value
of residential, commercial, and industrial land can be determined. Moreover, it is
said to be the best approach to the value of residential improvements, when used
in conjunction with the cost approach. Presumably, commercial and industrial im-
provements require use of all three approaches for a proper appraisal.
1973]
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experts. 19 It is not the purpose of this comment to summarize the al-
ready well-publicized economic and practical defects of fractional assess-
ments.20  Rather, this comment seeks only to analyze the power of the
State Board of Equalization to compel fractional assessments. Relevant
"See, for example, PROPERTY TAXATION IN MONTANA, supra note 1 at 31-32; Tide-
man, Fractional Assessments-Do Our Courts Sanction Inequality?, 16 HASTINGS
L.J. 573 (1965); Lewis, Equality in Property Assessments, 9 MARYLAND L. REV.
246 (1948).
2The author cannot, however, resist the temptation to refute the only argument that
can be made in favor of fractional assessment. The contention is that fractional
assessment is of no consequence so long as assessments are made at a reasonably
uniform fraction of market value. The argument is perhaps logically sound, but
factually fallacious. For there is evidence indicating that there is a correlation be-
tween fractional assessments and non-uniform assessments. PROPERTY TAXATION IN
MONTANA, supra note 1 at 31. Common sense supports this theory, since: (1) frac-
tional assessment muzzles the taxpayer, quieting potential complaints of non-uniform-
ity, by leading him to believe that he has been favored by low assessment levels;
and (2) the taxpayer is less likely to be aware of deviations from the established
assessment level, where assessed values are stated in fractions of market value.
Moreover, current empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that fractional assess-
ments are related to non-uniform assessments. A forty-nine county sales-assessment
ratio study conducted during the past seven years by the State Board of Equalization
indicates that non-uniform assessment is a serious problem in Montana. The following
tables, compiled from information furnished by the State Board of Equalization in
1972 to U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operation, indicate the high degree
of non-uniformity which exists in the assessment of home building sites and resi-
dential housing. The tables were taken from PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION AND
ASSESSMENT PRACTICES IN MONTANA, supra note 8 at 30-31.
Table I-Single Family Residential In County Seats
[Average of data is 2 years old.]
Average
By population of COD- COD-38
county seat AM* per cent*
Population 1,000 and under-
11 county seats
Population 1,000 to 10,000-
31 county seats
Population 10,000 and over-
7 county seats
Average for 49 counties 18.1 22.9
Table II-All Vacant Residential Lots, Suburban Tracts, and Rural Building Sites
(Excluding Building Sites on Agricultural Lands)
[Average of data is 2 years old.]
Average
By population of COD- COD-38
county seat AM* per cent*
Population 1,uuu and unaer-
11 counties
Population 1,000 to 10,000-
31 counties
Population 10,000 and over-
7 counties
39.0
Average for 49 counties 44.5 49.2
''COD" means coefficient of dispersion, which is a measure of assessment uni-
formity in relation to market value. ''COD-AM" is a coefficient of dispersion based
on deviations from the average level of assessment. It indicates the degree of assess-
ment uniformity in fact. 'COD-38 per cent" is a coefficient of dispersion based
on deviations from the level of assessment commanded by the State Board of Equali-
zation. It measures the degree of compliance with the Board's forty per cent rule.
The larger the coefficient, the greater the lack of uniformity. According to the Board,
a coefficient of ten or less indicates a very high degree of uniformity, while 20 or
higher is an indication that an entire reappraisal of the surveyed class of property is
necessary. 5
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to this limited purpose is a consideration of the legal effect of the Board's
forty per cent rule on the legislature's tax and spending policies.
The forty per cent level of assessment was set on the basis of an
ad hoc agreement between the county commissioners, assessors, and the
State Board of Equalization. 21 The rationale was that a forty per cent
assessment of city and town lots and rural and urban improvements was
the minimum level at which, using maximum mill levy rates set by statute,
local governments could generate enough tax revenue to function.22
The express purpose of the forty per cent rule was, therefore, to
. . . alter existing statutory taxing and bonding limitations by
making them more restrictive ta. c.tem.plated by law. This
represents the fiscal capacities of local governments and leaves some
of them with little or no financial elbow room.'
In addition, the forty per cent rule is a blatant disregard of the clear
legislative mandate of § 84-401, R.C.M. 1947, which commands that all
property be assessed at full cash value. Finally, the Board's rule
effectively emasculates Montana's property classification laws. As noted
previously, taxable value is determined under the classification laws by
applying different percentages to the appraised values of the several
classes of property. The classification laws expressly presume that the
appraised values before application of the classification scheme are at
"true and full value. '24 Since urban and rural improvements and city
and town lots comprise but one of the several classes of property, the
forty per cent rule grants to these kinds of property "tax windfalls at
the expense of others" 2 5-- windfalls in no way authorized by the legis-
lature. "[T]he result is a serious distortion of the intended effect of
the classification law. 26
The overall legal consequence of the forty per cent rule is that it
is an odd species of administrative rule-making. The State Board of
Equalization, by its alteration and disregard of the legislature's statutory
tax and spending policy, considers its legislative rule-making power to
be superior to that of the legislative branch of government. Through
the forty per cent rule the State Board has denominated itself a "fourth
branch" of state government. It remains to be seen whether, under the
present constitution, this usurpation of legislative power is permissible.
C. The Legality of the Forty Per Cent Rule Under the Present
Constitution
Article 12, § 15 of the present constitution defines the duties of
the State Board of Equalization. It provides that:
2'Testimony of J. Morley Cooper, then Chairman of the State Board of Equalization,
PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION AND ASSESSMENT PRACTICES IN MONTANA, supra
note 8 at 3.
"Id. at 3-4.
WPROPERTY TAXATION IN MONTANA, supra note 1 at 31.
-§ 84-302, R.C.M. 1947.
2PROPERTY TAXATION IN MONTANA, supra note 1 at 32.
"Id.
1973]
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The state board of equalization shall adjust and equalize the valua-
tion of taxable property among the several counties, and the different
classes of taxable property in any county and in the several counties
and between individual taxpayers; supervise and review the acts
of the county assessors and county boards of equalization; change,
increase, or decrease valuations made by county assessors or equalized
by county boards of equalization; and exercise such authority and
do all things necessary to secure a fair, just and equitable valua-
tion of all taxable property among counties, between the different
classes of property, and between individual taxpayers.
1Originally, § 15 had simply made it the duty of the State Board "to
adjust and equalize the valuation of the taxable property among the
several counties of the state." In 1896, in State ex rel. Wallace v. State
Board of Equalization,2 7 it was held that, under § 15, the State Board
did not have the power to increase the assessed valuations made by
county assessors and equalized by county commissioners (the county
boards of equalization) .28 Section 15 was amended in 191629 to abrogate
the rule of Wallace and greatly expand the State Board's powers. Six
years later § 15 was amended to its present form.30 The 1922 amend-
ment simply transformed the discretionary powers granted to the State
Board under the 1916 amendment into affirmative duties.
It is clear from a reading of the present § 15 that the constitutional
powers and duties of the State Board of Equalization are extensive. In
1931, State ex rel. Schoonover v. Stewart"' described § 15 as follows:
More comprehensive words could hardly have been chosen to ex-
press the intention of the people to confer upon the state broad
and far-reaching powers in matters relating to taxation.2
Schoonover, however, was careful to point out that the § 15 powers and
duties of the State Board did not include the power or duty to compel
fractional assessments. The court stated that: "Section 2001 (Rev.
Codes 1921) [later codified as § 84-401, R.C.M. 1947] provides that all
taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value. This section has
not been changed since its enactment . . .; and its mandate is the
law to-day. ' '. 3 Thus. "Whatever the character of the land it must . . .
be assessed on a uniform basis, namely: its full cash value.
'34
The rule of Schoonover-that even under § 15 all land must be
assessed at full cash value-was first altered in 1960 in Yellowstone
2
'State ex rel. Wallace v. State Board of Equalization, 18 Mont. 473, 46 P. 266 (1896).
2id. at 268.
"'Chapter 47, Montana Session Laws of 1915. The proposed amendment was approved
by the people in November, 1916, and became effective December 4, 1916, by
proclamation of. the governor.
8OChapter 11, Montana Extraordinary Session Laws of 1921. The amendment was ap-
proved by the people in November, 1922, and became effective December 14, 1922,
by proclamation of the governor.
"State ex rel. Schoonover v. Stewart, supra note 5.
211d. at 479.
3Id.
81Id. at 480.
[Vol. 34
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Pipe Line Co. v. State Board of Equalization.3 5 In this case it was
hcld that the duties to (1) adjust and equalize the valuation of taxable
property among the different classes of taxable property, and (2)
secure a fair, just and equitable valuation of all taxable property be-
tween the different classes of property, enabled the State Board to
assess the realty of pipe line companies at about seventy per cent of
full cash value, while at the same time permitting city and town lots
to be assessed at a lesser percentage of full cash value. The rule of
Yellowstone Pipe Line is that § 15 empowers the State Board to classify
property and assess different classes at different percentages of market
value; without violating the uniformity rules of the Montana constitu-
tion or the federal equal protection clause.36 The case does not expressly
state that the State Board may compel fractional assessments of selected
classes of property. However, implicit in the holding that all land need
not be assessed on a uniform basis is the proposition that land need not
be assessed at full cash value.
Five years later, in State Board of Equalization v. Vanderwood, 7
the implied rule of Yellowstone Pipe Line was made express. It was
held that § 15 empowered the State Board to compel assessment of city
and town lots and rural and urban improvements at forty per cent of
their full cash value. The Schoonover rule-that, even under § 15, all
land must be assessed at full cash value-was dead.
In arriving at the decision in Vanderwood, the Montana supreme
court placed heavy reliance on two recent California decisions: Michels
v. Watson38 and Hanks v. State Board of Equalization.3 9 In Michels the
issue was whether property could be fractionally assessed under Article
11, § 12 of the California constitution, which provides that all property
must be assessed at full cash value. It was held that fractional assess-
ment was permissible, and that the constitution merely required that full
cash value be the standard of assessment. In reaching its conclusion
the California court relied exclusively on the concurrence of three fac-
tors: (1) those who administer the California property tax had con-
sistently engaged in fractional assessment; (2) for over seventy-five
years the California courts, in uniformity cases like Yellowstone Pipe
Line, had recognized, recited, indicated, referred to, permitted, accepted,
approved, acknowledged, described, relied upon, were aware of, and did
not question the practice of fractional assessment; and (3) the Cali-
"Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 138 Mont. 603, 358 P.2d
55 (1960).
'The impact of these uniformity provisions on the forty per cent rule will be discussed
later.
'State Board of Equalization v. Vanderwood, 146 Mont. 276, 405 P.2d 652 (1965).
'
M ichels v. Watson, 40 Cal.Rptr. 464 (1964) (hearing denied by California supreme
court, October 28, 1964).
"Hanks v. State Board of Equalization, 40"Cal. Rptr. 478 (1964) (hearing denied by
California supreme court, October 28, 1964).
193731
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fornia legislature had been aware of the practice of fractional assess-
ment for over forty years, but had done nothing to correct it.
The losers in Michels attempted a different route to victory in
Hanks. The court was asked to hold that Article 13, § 9 of the California
constitution, which requires the State Board of Equalization to equalize
the valuations of taxable property, compels the State Board to raise
or lower assessments to conform to full cash value. In rejecting this
request, and holding that the State Board had the power to equalize
valuations on the basis of fractional assessments, the California court
relied on two points: (1) the administrative, legislative, and judicial
approval that fractional assessment and equalization had received in
California for decades; and (2) the reasoning that, if property had to
be assessed at full cash value in the first place, the power of the State
Board to equalize valuations would be superfluous and meaningless,
surely not what the constitutional draftsmen had intended.
The heavy reliance placed on Michels and Hanks by the Montana
supreme court in Vanderwood is misplaced and misguided. The Montana
court quoted extensively from both decisions, then simply concluded:
We adopt the reasoning of the California court and hold that
R.C.M. 1947, §84-401, [which requires assessment at full cash value)
is complied with so long as the same type of property bears the
same proportion of the tax base.'
One problem with this kind of reliance is that both Michels and Hanks
depended heavily on a uniquely long and uninterrupted history of legis-
lative and judicial approval of the practice of fractional assessment.
Indeed, the court said in Hanks that:
[N]o other state has a history and development of constitutional
and statutory tax provisions comparable to California . . .; in none
is found the clear-cut administrative, legislative and judicial recog-
nition of the practice of applying a uniform [fractional] ratio to
market value existing in this state. . . .'
Certainly, the Montana court could not "adopt" the California history
of fractional assessment. Moreover, even if the Montana court had
attempted to develop a history of fractional assessment in Montana,
similar to that in California, it would have failed. In California the un-
interrupted history of judicial approval of fractional assessment in uni-
formity cases spanned seventy-five years, and the cases were legion.
In Montana the "history" of such judicial approval was a scanty five
years, supported by only one decision, Yellowstone Pipe Line. Also, for
thirty-two years, under the Schoonover rule, fractional assessments were
expressly forbidden by the judiciary. For over forty years the Cali-
fornia legislature had been aware of the practice of fractional assess-
ment, but had done nothing to correct it. On the other hand, in Mon-
'
0 State Board of Equalization v. Vandergood, supra note 37 at 657.
"Hanks v. State Board of Equalization, supra note 39 at 484.
[Vol. 34
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tana, in every legislative attempt to effect a comprehensive reform of
the property tax, the practice of fractional assessment has been attacked.
The first attempt at comprehensive reform occurred in 1919, and re-
sulted in the property classification laws. One of the purposes of these
laws was "to relieve administrative officers from the apparent necessity
of continuing the legal fiction of full valuation in the face of contrary
facts. '42 Of course, as was recognized in Schoonover, in order for the
classification laws to operate properly, all property must "be assessed
on a uniform basis, namely: its full cash value. '43 In 1957 the legislature
again attempted to alleviate the practice of fractional assessment, by
enacting the Reclassification and Reappraisal Act of 1957, 44 which re-
quired the counties, under the direction of the State Board, to accom-
plish within five years an appraisal of all city and town lots and rural
and urban improvements, and thereafter to maintain current these
appraisals. The point here is that Montana's history of legislative and
judicial acceptance of fractional assessment is in no way comparable to
that of California. To the extent that Vanderwood's reliance on Michels
and Hanks flows from some sort of assumed similarity of legislative and
judicial history, the reliance is woefully misplaced.
The second problem with Vanderwood's reliance on Michels and Hanks
is that, absent the extended history of legislative and judicial approval
of fractional assessment, the legal reasoning of the California court
is patently absurd. Only Hanks relied on "reasoning," as opposed to
legislative and judicial history; and the "reasoning" was that the State
Board had the power to equalize valuations on a fractional basis, since,
if property had to be initially assessed at full cash value, this power
to equalize would be meaningless and unnecessary. A much more real-
istic holding would have been that the State Board's power to equalize
valuations was an insurance provision, designed to force assessment at
full cash value in those cases where the local assessors had initially
failed to do so.
The third and final problem with the Montana court's reliance on
Hanks and Michels is that, even with the aid of many decades of legis-
lative and judicial approval, the California court's holding that fractional
assessment and equalization are permissible is tenuous and dangerous
legal reasoning. This defect in reasoning was eloquently explained in a
dissent by Judge Fourt, which covered both Michels and Hanks:
'Hilger v. Moore, supra note 10 at 483. See atso, REPORT OF THE TAX AND LICENcE
COMMISSION TO TBE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, supra note 8 at 10-11, where it
is contended that the classification laws were necessary to put legislative controls
on the then existing practice of fractional assessment. It was primarily on the basis
of this report that the classification laws were enacted.
"State ez rel. Schoonover v. Stewart, supra note 5 at 480. See also, MONTANA STATE
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, SIXTEENTH BIENNIAL REPORT (1952-1954) at 15. There is
evidence that for about fifteen years the classification laws were effective in forcing
assessments to be made at or near full cash value. See, PROPERTY TAXATION IN
MONTANA, supra note 1 at 21-23, graphs 3-5.
"Chapter 191, Montana Session Laws of 1957; §§ 84-429.7 et seq.) R.C.M. 1947.
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The majority . . . in effect hold that the long, continued, systematic
and intentional violation of the law somehow constitutes or has
developed into a right in the assessor to violate the specific pro-
visions of the law ...
The Iowa Supreme Court in deciding a case where substantially the
same arguments were made as are asserted by the respondent in
this case said: "These duties which they have knowingly and de-
liberately refused to perform are imperative duties. They are
commands of the legislature. The defendants have no discretion in
the matter, with respect to obeying those commands. Since the
statute requires that all property shall be assessed and taxed at its
actual value, they have no right to disregard this legislative in-
junction, because they deem it unwise or inexpedient, or because
others in their position in the past have so violated the law." (Pierce
v. Green (1940) 229 Iowa 22, 294 N.W. 237, 248, 131 A.L.R. 335.) The
above quoted sentence from the Iowa case was quoted with approval
in Switz v. Township of Middleton, 40 N.J. Super. 217, 122 A.2d 649,
655, where the court declared improper and illegal a century old
practice of using fractional assessments.
No amount of juggling, subterfuge, circumvention, evasion, deception,
maneuvering, legalistic legerdemain or sorcery can change the plain
and specific provision of the Constitution [which requires assessment
at full value]."
The practical legal effect of Vanderwood is that legislative control
over the assessment policies of the State Board of Equalization is non-
existent. The only two limitations on the Board's policies are the uni-
formity provisions of the Montana constitution 46 and the equal protection
clause of the federal constitution. Under the established rules, neither
of these is violated by the fractional assessment of any given class of
property, here city and town lots and rural and urban improvements.
In the leading case of Hilger v. Moore, it was held that Montana's uni-
formity provisions require only that taxes be uniform upon property
of the same class.4 7 That is, the uniformity rules forbid unequal assess-
ment only as between properties of the same class. The fact that one
class of property is assessed at full market value while another at merely
a fraction thereof is of no consequence. The rule is the same under the
federal equal protection clause.
48
Rightly or wrongly, the State Board of Equalization has the power,
under the present constitution, to compel the fractional assessment of
city and town lots and rural and urban improvements.
"4Michels v. Watson, supra note 38 at 473 (dissenting opinion).
"The uniformity provisions are contained in Article 12, §§ 1 and 11. Section 1 pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
The necessary revenue for the support and maintenance of the state shall be provided
by the legislative assembly, which shall levy a uniform rate of assessment and taxa-
tion, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation
of all property, except that specifically provided for in this article.
Section 11 provides:
Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws and for public purposes only.
They shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits
of the authority levying the tax.
"Hilger v. Moore, supra note 10 at 481-482.
"See, Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 366-369 (1939).
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THE ASSESSMENT OF FARM AND GRAZING LAND ON THE BASIS OF PRODUCTIVE
VALUE RATHER THAN MARKET VALUE
A. Administrative History
On September 24, 1962, the State Board of Equalization promulgated
a schedule of assessed values for the various grades of non-irrigated
farm lands, grazing lands, and wild hay lands. The scheduled directed
that all county assessors fix the assessed values of such lands for 1963
and thereafter at the values assigned by the State Board. Twenty-six
counties defied the State Board's directive, and instead insisted on using
values assigned by a committee of the county commissioners' and county
assessors' associations. This defiance was tested by the State Board in
an original proceeding brought in the supreme court against one of the
twenty-six recalcitrant counties, Lewis and Clark.49 The State Board
lost the dispute on a technicality of administrative law. The court held
that: (1) § 84-710, R.C.M. 1947 requires that evidential hearings be
held prior to ordering changes in assessment values; and (2) since
such hearings were not held, the September 24, 1963 schedule of assessed
values was invalidly promulgated.50
Following this decision, on September 9, 1963, the State Board an-
nounced a schedule of public hearings to be held for the purpose of
hearing interested persons on the subject of assessed values for farm
and grazing lands. After the hearings were held a new schedule of
assessed values for these lands was issued on November 14, 1963. Under
this revised schedule assessed values of non-irrigated farm lands and
grazing lands were raised by about $1.25 per acre per grade. Values of
wild hay lands were lowered by about $6.50 per acre per grade. In
addition, schedules of assessed values for non-irrigated continuously
cropped farm land and tillable irrigated lands were promulgated. Since
1963 the schedule has been revised only twice. On August 15, 1967, a
new schedule was issued, in which the two lowest grades of non-
irrigated continuously cropped farm land were eliminated, and four
new intermediate sub-grades were added to each of the three classes
of tillable irrigated lands. Two years later, on June 18, 1969, two new
higher grades were added to non-irrigated farm lands, and the assessed
value of one previous grade of such land was lowered by $0.01. Though
there have been additions and subtractions of grades in classes, the
assessed values set in the 1963 directives are currently in use.
The assessed values for farm and grazing land, as set by the State
Board of Equalization, are at about twenty per cent of their market
value.5 Consequently, under the classification laws, the taxable value
4 State ex rel. State Board of Equalization v. govich, 142 Mont. 201, 383 P.2d 818
(1963).
"Id. at 820-822.
"MONTANA FISCAL AFFAIRs STUDY, supra note 13 at 386.
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of such lands is six per cent of their market value.5 2 However, this
twenty per cent ratio of assessed to market value "was due more to
accident than to any specific design."5 The reason is that assessed
values of farm and grazing lands, unlike those of city and town lots and
rural and urban improvements, are not set on the basis of market value.
Rather, these lands are assessed according to what is called their pro-
ductivity value. 54 It is purely accidental that productivity value is about
twenty per cent of market value.
The method used to determine productivity value is complex, so
only a basic outline of the steps involved will be set forth. First, the
lands are classified into economic classes and grades on the basis of
their expected average productivity of given indicator crops (e.g., wheat,
barley, hay, alfalfa) in the case of farm lands and animal unit carry-
ing capacity in the case of grazing lands.5 5 The next step is to assign
values per acre to the established classes and grades. This is a two-step
process involving: (1) the determination of net income; and (2) capital-
ization of net income into land values.56 Gross income is computed by
multiplying average expected annual productivity in terms of indicator
crops or carrying capacity by average expected crop or animal selling
prices. From gross income is subtracted annual estimated operating
costs. taxes, and interest to arrive at annual net income. The annual net
income is then capitalized to find the sum which will, in accordance
with the prevailing rate of earning for farm and grazing land, produce
annually a sum equivalent to the annual net income. This sum arrived
at through capitalization of the net income is the assessed value.
B. The Effect of the Productivity Assessment System on Legislative
Tax and Spending Policy
Insofar as the assessments of farm and grazing land constitute
de facto fractional assessments, the productivity assessment system has
"Section 84-301, R.C.M. 1947 places farm and grazing lands in Class Four, and § 84-
302, R.C.M. 1947 provides that the taxable value of properties in Class Four is thirty
per cent of assessed value.
"MONTANA FISCAL AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 13 at 386.
5
'As will be explained, productivity value is determined by a capitalization of net
income. The income approach is a valid method of determining market value. How-
ever, where, as here, the income approach yields a value substantially different from
actual market value, then it is clear that the income approach is not being used to
determine market value. Presumably, this is the reason for the use of the term
''productivity value." As used by the State Board to value agricultural and grazing
land the income approach is not at all an attempt to determine market value. Pro-
ductivity value and market value are two entirely different standards, even though in
some instances the method (an income approach) used to determine productivity value
may also be used to arrive at market value.
BSee, MONTANA AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION BULLETIN No. 348, R. R. Renne
and H. H. Lord, ASSESSMENT OF MONTANA FARM LANDS, October 1937 at 43-44.
5The valuation process is described in detail in MONTANA AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT
STATION BULLETIN No. 404, H. H. Lord, S. W. Voelker, and L. F. Gieseker, STANDARDS
AND PROCEDURES FOR CLASSIFICATION AND VALUATION OF LAND FOR ASSESSMENT PUR-
POSES IN MONTANA, June 1942 at 15-19. The description given above in the text is
a summary of the procedure outlined in this document.
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the same qualitative effect on legislative tax and spending policy as
does the forty per cent rule. In addition, the productivity assessment
system is a more blatant disregard of § 84-401, R.C.M. 1947, which
requires assessment at full cash or market value, since market value
is completely ignored in favor of productivity value. At least under
the forty per cent rule market value is the ultimate standard of value.
Finally, the productivity assessment system is a more serious alteration
of the property classification laws, since it has the effect of setting
different taxable values on different kinds of property in the same legis-
lative class.57
The productivity assessment system's inherent disregard anu alter-
ation of the legislature's tax and spending policy is justified by its
proponents on the grounds that: (1) property should be taxed accord-
ing to its ability to pay;58 and (2) the income producing potential of
land is a better indication of ability to pay than is market value. 59 The
problem with this justification is not that farm and grazing land is
assessed on the basis of productivity value, but that all other land is
assessed according to market value. If property taxes should be based
on ability to pay, and income potential is the best indicator of ability
to pay, then all land should be valued on the basis of its income poten-
tial. If followed to its logical and equitable conclusion, some types of
property-notably owner-occupied single family dwellings-should pay
57As noted previously, city and town lots, urban and rural improvements, and farm
and grazing lands are all in Class Four under § 84-301, R.C.M. 1947. Section 84-302,
R.C.M. 1947 provides that the taxable value of Class Four property is to be set at
thirty per cent of its assessed value. Since city and town lots and rural and urban
improvements are assessed at thirty-eight per cent of market value, whereas agri-
cultural and grazing land are assessed at only twenty per cent, the productivity
assessment system has the effect of setting the taxable value of agricultural and
grazing lands at about half of that used for city and town lots and rural and urban
improvements.
aSMONTANA AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION BULLETIN No. 348, supra note 55 at 5.
Mid. at 22. One of the strongest arguments in favor of the productivity assessment
system is that, if it is assumed that income is the best indication of ability to pay,
valuation should be based on income, since there is no correlation between income
value and market value. There is current empirical evidence which strongly supports
the contention that the market value of farm and grazing land is not at all related
to its income producing potential. The recent MONTANA FISCAL AFFAIRS STUDY, supra
note 13 found at 391-393 that:
Comparison of the annual growth rates in land market values and in realized net
farm income shows that the annual growth in farmland market values [from 1950
to 1967] exceeded the annual growth in total net income per farm by about 3.2
percentage points. The annual growth in the market value of farmland is 2.8
times higher than the annual growth in net farm income per year.
A number of factors have caused this accelerated rise in market value of land
relative to income potential: (1) the farmer himself is buying additional land at
high prices to expand operations and make efficient use of expensive modern equip-
ment and methods; (2) farm land is being purchased at high prices by nonfarmers
for hobby farming and to obtain tax advantages; (3) farm land is being purchased
at high prices for nonfarm uses such as residential, commercial, and industrial sites;
and (4) the fact that farm and grazing land have low tax rates itself increases its
market value by approximately four to six per cent. See, MONTANA FISCAL AFFAIRS
STUDY, supra note 13 at 389-391 and 393-394; and MONTANA AGRICULTURAL EXPERI-
MENT STUDY BULLETIN No. 583, Layton S. Thompson, SALE PRICES OF MONTANA
AGRICULTURAL LAND BY CLASS AND GRADE, December 1963 at 5. 14
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no property tax at all, since they do not produce income and are not
available for the production of income. Yet, the outrageous fact is that
owner-occupied single family dwellings pay relatively twice as much tax
as farm and grazing land,60 a fact which is totally inconsistent with the
productivity assessment system's seemingly equitable principle that taxes
should be based on ability to pay.61 Elimination of the property tax's
false test of ability to pay (market value) for one type of property,
while retaining it for all others, has clearly not yet been sufficiently
justified by the proponents of the productivity assessment system.
C. The Legality of the Productivity Assessment System Under The
Present Constitution
The current legality of the productivity assessment system may be
analyzed in two ways: (1) legality as a de facto fractional assessment;
and (2) legality as a difference in treatment of two kinds of property
in the same legislative class, both with respect to the level of assess-
ment (twenty per cent of market value versus forty per cent) and
the method of assessment (productivity value versus market value).
According to the Montana supreme court in State Board of Equal-
ization v. Vanderwood the fact that agricultural and grazing land is
assessed at merely a fraction of its market value is of no consequence.
As previously discussed in conjunction with the forty per cent rule,
Vanderwood held that: "[T]he State Board has the power and the
duty to equalize the assessment of properties at a percentage of their
market value.
62
The second legal problem with the productivity assessment system
is that it treats property of the same legislative classification differently
with respect to both the level of assessment and the manner of assess-
ment. As previously noted, the Montana court in Yellowstone Pipe Line
Co. v. State Board of Equalization held that the Board's constitutional
duties6 3 to "adjust and equalize the valuation of taxable property among
. . . the different classes of taxable property" and to "do all things
necessary to secure a fair, just and equitable valuation of taxable
6°See, discussion in note 57.
5 This flaw in the reasoning of the productivity assessment system's proponents has
been justified by its proponents on the ground that "the economic rental value of
these properties [land and improvements other than farm and grazing land] capital-
ized in the same manner as income-producing property indicates an earning capacity
value at least equal to forty per cent of the 'market value.' " MONTANA TAX STUDY,
Appendixe 1 to Part 6, MONTANA PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT PROPLEmS, Howard H.
Lord, Member, State Board of Equalization (1966) at 9. In other words, the argument
is that the State Board's forty per cent rule eliminates the apparent inequity and
inconsistency. The fault of this specious reasoning is that it totally ignores the fact
that some properties, like owner-occupied single family dwellings, do not produce
income and are not available to produce income. Something that cannot be rented,
because occupied, simply cannot have an "economic rental value."
EState Board of Equalization v. Vandergood, supra note 37 at 657-658.
"MONT. CONST. art. 12, § XV (1889).
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property . . . between the different classes of property" give the Board
the power to classify property irrespective of the classification of the
legislature.6 4 Apparently, inherent in its power to classify is the power
to discriminate against other types of property in the same legislative
classification, both as to level and method of assessment. 5 The con-
sequence is that the legislative commands of full market value assess-
ment and classification are not binding on the State Board of Equali-
zation, but are "directory '66 only.
The only limitations on the State Board's constitutional power to
decide what level and manner of assessment is "fair, just, and equitable"
are the uniormi y provisions uf the Montana const.Itution 6 7 a
federal equal protection clause. Neither of these prohibit the assessment
of farm and grazing land alone at twenty per cent of market value and
on the basis of productivity. The uniformity provisions have been inter-
preted to mean that taxes need only be uniform on the same class of
property,68 and that the method of assessment need only be the same
on all property within the same class.69 The requirements of the equal
protection clause are identical.7 0
An argument frequently made by members of the State Board on
behalf of the productivity assessment system is that it is authorized
under § 84-429.12, R.C.M. 1947.7' The argument has never received the
approval of the Montana court, and for good reason. Section 84-429.12,
R.C.M. 1947 provides that the State Board must provide:
1. For a general and uniform method of classifying lands in the
state of Montana for the purpose of securing an equitable and uni-
form basis of assessment of said lands for taxation purposes.
All lands shall be classified according to their use or uses and graded
within each class according to soil and productive capacity. In such
classification work, use shall be made of soil surveys and maps and
all other pertinent available information. All lands must be classi-
fied by forty (40) acre tracts or fractional lots.
2. For a general and uniform method of appraising city and town
lots.
3. For a general and uniform method of appraising rural and urban
improvements.
4. For a general and uniform method of appraising timberlands.
"Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. State Board of Equalization, supra note 35 at 66-67.
O'Yellowstone Pipe Line specifically held that the State Board could treat realty of
utilities and pipe line companies differently than city and town lots and rural and
urban improvements. Vandergood specifically held, on the basis of Yellowstone Pipe
Line, that farm and grazing land could be treated differently than city and town
lots and urban and rural improvements.
"This is the term used in Vanderwood, supra note 37 at 658 to describe the quality of
legislative control over the State Board's assessment practices.
67See, supra at note 46.
"Hilger v. Moore, supra note 10 at 481-482.
"Fruit Growers Express Co. v. Brett, 94 Mont. 281, 22 P.2d 171, 175 (1933).
InSee, Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, supra note 48 at 366-369.
"Speech made by Howard H. Lord, then Chairman of the State Board of Equalization,
entitled, "Farm Land Assessment in Montana," presented at the 1967 Conference
of the Western States Association of Tax Administrators, Salt Lake City, Utah,
September 7, 1967, at 3.
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Manifestly, this statute authorizes only two things: (1) appraisal of city
and town lots, rural and urban improvements, and timberlands; and (2)
classification by soil and productivity of all other lands, namely, farm
and grazing lands. It clearly does not authorize appraisal or assessment
of farm and grazing lands on the basis of productivity value. "Classifi-
cation," "appraisal," and "assessment" are terms with different mean-
ings.72 "Classification" means simply the placing of lands of similar
use and productivity in the same class or grade. "Appraisal" is the
determination of market value. "Assessment" is the determination of
market value. "Assessment" is the determination of value for property
tax purposes. Since classification is neither appraisal nor assessment,
the contention that the legislature authorized the productivity assess-
ment system, when all that is authorized is classification, is without
merit. The argument is, of course, unnecessary, since the Montana
supreme court has held that, no matter what the legislature has said,
the State Board, under the present constitution, may make assessments
at fractions of market value, and may assess at different levels and in
accordance with different standards of value property of different types
within the same legislative classification. It remains to be seen whether
the power of the State Board to override the legislature remains in
Montana's new constitution, which becomes effective on July 1, 1973.
THE LEGALITY OF PRESENT ASSESSMENT PRACTICES
UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION
The broad constitutional powers of the State Board of Equalization.
contained in Article 12, § 15 of the present constitution, do not appear
in the new constitution. These were the powers relied on by the Mon-
tana court in Vanderwood and Yellowstone Pipe Line to hold that the
State Board, contrary to legislative mandates on assessment, has the
power to order fractional assessment, and assessment at different levels
and by different methods of property of different types within the
same legislative classification. In place of the present Article 12, § 15 is
Article 8, § 3 of the new constitution. Section 3 provides that: "The
state shall appraise, assess, and equalize the valuation of all property
which is to be taxed in the manner provided by law."
The clear intent of § 3 is to bring control of the property tax
assessment process back into the hands of the legislature. In its formal
report to the Constitutional Convention, the Convention's Committee
on Revenue and Finance stated:
The details of any tax administration system should be left to the
legislature, which is best qualified to develop the most efficient,
modern and fair system necessary for the needs of the day. Tax
'
2See, MONTANA AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION BULLETIN No. 459, Harold G.
Halcrow and H. R. Stucky, PROCEDURES FOR LAND RECLASSIFICATION IN MONTANA,
Feb. 1949 at 5.
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administration should be established by the legislature and admini-
stered by the executive branch of government, not by a constitu-
tional board which is immune to control by all three branches of
government and immune from control by the people. A constitu-
tionally enshrined board is less answerable for its activities and is
freer to ignore the mandates and directives of the legislative
assembly.'
What disturbed the Convention's Revenue and Finance Committee was
that the present § 15, as interpreted in Vanderwood and Yellowstone Pipe
Line, had "removed the assessment process too far from the people. '74
The intent of § 3-that appraisal, assessment, and equalization shall be
in the manner provided by law-is "that the people through the legisla-
ture should have the right to set out guidelines as to what was fair.
just, and equitable subject only to constitutional equal protection clauses
and that those powers should not be delegated to an appointed board."75
Section 3 does not compel assessment, appraisal, or equalization
at any particular level or by any given method. It simply requires that
these tax functions be performed "in the manner provided by law." At
the time of the Constitutional Convention the "manner provided by law"
was that: (1) all taxable property shall be assessed at its full cash
value ;76 and (2) the taxable value of city and town lots, rural and
urban improvements, and farm and grazing land shall be thirty per
cent of its full and true value. 77 Prior to the 1973 legislature the forty
per cent rule and the productivity assessment system seemed headed for
extinction on July 1, 1973, the effective date of the new constitution.
Section 84-708 (5), R.C.M. 1947, which defines the powers and duties
of the State Board, provides that the State Board shall:
[A]djust and equalize the valuation of taxable property among the
several counties, and the different classes of taxable property in
any county and in the several counties and between individual
taxpayers; supervise and review the acts of county assessors and
county boards of equalization; change, increase or decrease valua-
tions made by county assessors or equalized by county boards of
equalization; and exercise such authority and do all things neces-
sary to secure a fair, just and equitable valuation of all taxable
property among counties, between the different classes of prop-
erty and between individual taxpayers.
This language is substantially identical to that which appears in Article
12, § 15 of the present constitution. The .973 legislative assembly, in
"MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, REVENUE AND FINANCE COMMITWE ON CON-
STITUTIONAL REvIsIoN, Report No. 8 (Feb. 18, 1972) at 17-18.
"Testimony of Russell C. McDonough, member of the Constitutional Convention's Com-
mittee on Revenue and Finance, PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION AND ASSESSMENT
PRACTICES IN MONTANA, supra note 8 at 5.
7Id. See also, PROCEEDINGS OP THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 4252-4253 (1972).
That the new constitution is clearly intended to divest the State Board of its un-
controllable power over assessment practices is further buttressed by the fact that
during the debates on § 3 an amendment to it was offered embodying the powers
contained in the present § 15. This amendment was rejected by the Convention. See,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 4253-5332 (1972).
"§ 84-401, R.C.M. 1947.
"§§ 84-301 and 84-302, R.C.M. 1947.
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§§ 52-53 of House Bill No. 16, repealed this provision, and re-enacted
it as § 84-708.1(3), R.C.M. 1947. Section 84-708.1(3), R.C.M. 1947 is
identical to the above quoted § 84-708(5), R.C.M. 1947, except that the
duties are transferred from the State Board of Equalization to the State
Department of Revenue. The effective date of House Bill No. 16 is July
1, 1973.
In effect, what the legislature did in House Bill No. 16 was to give
to the Department of Revenue the powers which the State Board of
Equalization has under the present constitution. Consequently, the
Department of Revenue may continue the forty per-cent rule and the
productivity assessment system, even under the new constitution, since
the "manner provided by law" is, by virtue of House Bill No. 16, sub-
stantially identical to the system which exists under the present con-
stitution.
Moreover, the 1973 legislature specifically approved the productivity
assessment system. House Bill No. 15, in § 257, amended § 84-401,
R.C.M. 1947 to provide:
All taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value except
the assessment of agricultural lands shall be based upon the pro-
ductive capacity of the lands when valued for agricultural purposes
and shall be so valued unless a different use is demonstrated. (Em-
phasis indicates the amendment.)
An identical amendment to § 84-401, R.C.M. 1947 appears in § 2 of
Senate Bill No. 72; however, this legislation places a number of condi-
tions on the use of the productivity assessment system. Section 4 of
Senate Bill No. 72 requires that the land be actively devoted to agri-
culture, be five or more contiguous acres in size or agriculturally pro-
duce at least fifteen per cent of the owner's annual gross income, and
that the landowner apply to assessing officials for an assessment in
accordance with productive capacity. Interestingly enough, both House
Bill No. 15 and Senate Bill No. 72 were enacted into law.
The forty per cent rule has not yet received specific legislative sanc-
tion.78  However, as previously noted, the Department of Revenue has
been given the power, under House Bill No. 16, to make fractional
assessments at different levels for different types of property.
CONCLUSION
Article 8, § 3 of the new constitution, which requires that property
tax assessment be in the manner provided by law, is a great improve-
ment over the assessment system of Article 12, § 15 of the present con-
7
8A legislative decision one way or the other may occur in 1974. House Bill No. 398,
which was introduced in the 1973 legislature, but held over for consideration by the
1974 session, proposes the following amendment to § 84-401, R.C.M. 1947: "All
taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value and not at any percentage
thereof.'" (Emphasis indicates the proposed amendment.)
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stitution, under which the State Board of Equalization could disregard
legislative assessment mandates, and, with the help of the Montana
supreme court, make tax assessment policy subject to the control of
virtually no one. Under the new constitution, the state tax authority,
the Department of Revenue, assumes its proper role as a tax law admin-
istrator, rather than a tax legislature.
Whether the productivity assessment system and the forty per cent
rule are "fair, just, and equitable" as a matter of sound tax admini-
stration and economic policy is an issue beyond the scope of this com-
ment. It is sufficient here to simply point out that under the new
constitution these practices are subject to the democratic processes of
open debate and legislative judgment. Though the 1973 legislature
sustained the continuance of the present assessment system for the time
being,7 9 it is much too early to tell whether the productivity assessment
system and forty per cent rule are sufficiently sound to withstand
what it is hoped will be a strenuous test of public scrutiny.
"It is submitted that the judgment of the 1973 legislature in continuing the current
assessment system under the new constitution was more influenced by considerations
of changing too much too fast than by considerations of sound tax administration
and economic policy.
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